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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE – CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 
 
Summary 
 
  The Court considered consolidated appeals from a first-degree murder conviction and an 
order denying a motion for new trial in a death penalty case. 
 
Disposition/Outcome 
 
 The Court concluded that there were no errors in the original trial and sentencing that 
would warrant a new penalty hearing. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the judgment of 
conviction and the order denying a motion for a new trial. 
   
Factual and Procedural History 
 
 In January 2003, Appellant Beau Maestas (“Maestas”) attempted to purchase 
methamphetamine from a dealer in Mesquite, NV. The dealer did not have the drugs and directed 
Maestas to a married couple, whom Maestas found at a casino in Mesquite. There, Maestas 
purchased what he thought was methamphetamine from the couple for $125, but the bag actually 
contained salt. Maestas returned to the casino, fought with the seller, and was escorted from the 
premises. 
 
 Maestas and his sister then went to his girlfriend’s home, where he asked for a knife. The 
three then drove to the RV Park where the salt-selling couple lived. Maestas initially went to the 
couple’s trailer alone, but returned to the car when the two little girls inside refused to let him in. 
Leaving his girlfriend to watch for the couple, Maestas went back to the trailer with his sister. 
The siblings returned to the car approximately 10 to 15 minutes later. Maestas’ hands and 
clothing were covered in blood. He then went to his grandmother’s house to clean up and get her 
car. On the way, both siblings discussed stabbing the little girls. Maestas, his girlfriend and his 
grandmother then fled to Utah. 
 
 The first officer to respond to the scene found two girls, ages 3 and 10, with numerous 
stab wounds all over their bodies. The younger girl was unconscious and died at the hospital. The 
older girl survived but suffered a stab wound that severed her spine, leaving her paraplegic. 
Evidence collected at the scene connected Maestas and his sister with the crime. 
  
After authorities detained Maestas, he confessed to the attack, claiming that he acted 
alone. He later pleaded guilty to multiple charges, including first-degree murder. The State also 
filed a notice of intent to seek the death penalty based on two aggravating circumstances: (1) the 
murder occurred in the commission of a burglary and (2) the victim was under 14 years of age. 
The first jury was unable to reach a verdict on the sentence for his first-degree murder charge, so 
the district court called a mistrial and assembled a second jury. At the second hearing, the State 
                                                          
1
 By Richard A. Andrews 
presented the victim’s age as the only aggravating circumstance, and introduced the physical and 
psychological impact of the crime upon the older sister. 
 
As mitigating factors, Maestas focused on his youth (19 at the time of the crime), abusive 
childhood, drug use, stunted cognitive functioning, admission of guilt, and remorse. Testimony 
from Maestas’ family and a psychologist supported these claims.  
 
The jury unanimously found the victim’s age proven beyond reasonable doubt.  The jury 
did find mitigating circumstances, but it found that that aggravating circumstance outweighed the 
mitigating circumstances and sentenced Maestas to death. Maestas appealed. 
 
While that appeal was pending, one of the jurors contacted Maestas’ counsel because she 
had second thoughts about the verdict. She claimed that the jury foreperson made comments 
about the case and used special information during deliberations. As a result, Maestas filed a 
motion for a new trial.  
 
During an evidentiary hearing, the district court found the claims of the newly dissenting 
juror not credible for several reasons and the testimony of the other jurors to be conflicting and, 
in some cases, inadmissible because it was part of the deliberative process. Furthermore, the 
court found the foreperson credible. Therefore, the district court dismissed Maestas’ claims of 
misconduct, which Maestas appealed. 
 
Discussion 
 
 Justice Cherry wrote for the unanimous Court, seated en banc.  The Court principally 
focused on two of Maestas’ claims: (1) NRS 175.556 violates the Eighth Amendment and (2) 
allegations of jury misconduct.  The Court began by addressing the constitutional challenge to 
NRS 175.556, which allowed the district court to choose between a life-without-parole sentence 
or a second jury after the first jury could not come to a unanimous verdict.
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addressed the issues related to the motion for a new trial as well as Maestas’ other claims, 
concluded by a mandatory review of the death sentence.
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Constitutionality of NRS 175.556 
 
 When the jury is unable to reach a unanimous penalty verdict in a case where the death 
penalty is sought, NRS 175.556 affords the district court discretion to choose between imposing 
a life-without-parole sentence and empaneling a new jury to determine the sentence.  Maestas 
argued that NRS 175.556 violates the Eighth Amendment in allowing the district court to expose 
the defendant to another penalty hearing with the possibility of a death sentence. 
 
The Court disagreed, finding that the statute does not give the district court authority to 
impose a death penalty, because the possibility of a death sentence is left to the new jury. 
Furthermore, the new jury can choose a lesser penalty and must consider aggravating and 
mitigating circumstances in making its decision. The Court held that this process appropriately 
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channels “the sentencer’s discretion to avoid imposing death in an arbitrary or capricious 
manner,”4 and therefore NRS 175.556 does not violate the Eighth Amendment.  
  
Motion for a New Trial 
 
The Court next considered the motion for a new trial based on jury misconduct and bias. 
After a review for abuse of discretion, the Court found no clear error. The Court relied on the 
district court’s credibility determinations in the evidentiary hearing and found no evidence of 
misconduct. Furthermore, Maestas failed to show the jury intentionally concealed bias against 
him. Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion for denying the motion for a new trial. 
 
Remaining Claims 
 
          Maestas’ other claims challenged the death sentence based on alleged problems with the 
charging document, notice of intent to seek the death penalty, the admissibility of evidence 
presented during the penalty trial, alleged prosecutorial misconduct, and cumulative error. The 
Court held that none of those claims warranted relief from the judgment of conviction. 
 
Mandatory Review of Death Penalty 
 
 The Court finally undertook a mandatory review of the death penalty, as required by 
Nevada law. Specifically, the Court is required to consider: “(c) Whether the evidence supports 
the finding of an aggravating circumstances; (d) Whether the sentence of death was imposed 
under the influence of passion, prejudice or any arbitrary factor; and (e) Whether the sentence of 
death is excessive, considering both the crime and the defendant.”5 
 
 The evidence demonstrated beyond a reasonable doubt that the victim was under fourteen 
years old when she was murdered, proving the aggravating circumstance. Next, the record lacked 
any indication that the jury acted in any way other than thoughtful and deliberative, as evidenced 
by the jury’s finding of mitigating factors. Thus, the Court found no reason to find that the jury 
was influenced by passion, prejudice, or any arbitrary factor.  
 
Finally, the Court considered whether the death sentence was excessive. In so doing, they 
asked, “[Are] the crime and defendant . . . of the class that warrants the imposition of death?”6 
Their answer was in the affirmative, as the evidence showed that Maestas got a knife and drove 
to the trailer park to get revenge. He knew that the girls were alone in the trailer tricked them into 
letting him in. He then viciously stabbed to death a defenseless three-year-old girl, at which point 
he cleaned up and fled the state. Despite the fact that Maestas expressed remorse at trial, his 
letters and comments after the crimes showed little empathy. Accordingly, the Court held that the 
death penalty in this case was not excessive. 
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Conclusion 
 
 When a jury is unable to reach a unanimous penalty verdict in a case where the death 
penalty is sought, the discretion granted to district courts by NRS 175.556 to choose between 
imposing a life-without-parole sentence and empaneling a new jury to determine the sentence 
does not violate the Eighth Amendment. 
 
  
 
 
